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Brexit:	Simply	an	omnishambles	or	a	major	policy
fiasco?
The	UK’s	referendum	on	EU	membership	in	2016	set	off	a	chain	of	political	events	that
can	best	be	described	as	an	‘omnishambles’.	But	how	did	the	country	end	up	at	this	point,
and	what	explains	the	approach	pursued	to	implement	Brexit	following	the	result?	Jeremy
Richardson	and	Berthold	Rittberger	present	their	own	overview	of	the	Brexit	saga,
distinguishing	between	the	idiosyncratic	processes	and	the	more	general	trends	that	led
to	the	referendum	and	its	aftermath.
Political	satire	and	the	reality	of	politics	have	been	hand	in	glove	in	Britain	for	a	long	period.	For	example,	the
political	satire	TV	series,	The	Thick	of	It,	captured	perfectly	the	serial	chaos	of	elite	politics	in	Britain.	One	2009
episode	featured	the	Minister	for	the	(fictional)	Department	of	Social	Affairs	and	Citizenship	being	involved	in	a
series	of	disasters,	prompting	the	now	famous	rebuke	from	the	Government’s	Director	of	Communications,	as
follows:
‘Jesus	Christ,	you	are	a	f***ing	omnishambles,	that’s	what	you	are.	You’re	like	that	coffee	machine,	you
know:	From	bean	to	cup,	you	f***	up.’
The	term	omnishambles,	meaning	a	situation	which	is	shambolic	from	every	angle,	was	awarded	the	word	of	the
year	prize	by	the	Oxford	Dictionary	in	2012,	the	jury	saying	that	it	had	crossed	over	into	real	life	in	that	year.
Whatever	happened	in	Britain	in	2012,	it	pales	into	comparison	with	the	Brexit	omnishambles	enacted	in	Britain
2016-19.
How,	then,	did	the	Brexit	omnishambles	come	about?	On	the	face	of	it,	the	answer	is	perfectly	simple,	namely	the
result	of	the	fateful	2016	referendum.	However,	the	Brexit	story	is	one	of	slow	tectonic	forces	at	work,	leading	to
spectacular	eruptions,	first	in	2016,	then	throughout	2019.
The	first	possible	cause	is	that	Britain	never	quite	‘fitted’	the	EU	and	was	destined	to	leave	at	some	point.	Secondly,
the	EU	itself	contributed	to	the	Brexit	fiasco	and	might	have	been	engaged	in	some	kind	of	‘slow	burn’	blunder	itself.
Thirdly,	Brexit	was	a	domestic	policy-making	problem,	exacerbated	by	long-term	changes	in	the	British	policy	style.
An	obvious	starting	point	for	explaining	Brexit	is	Britain	as	‘an	awkward	partner’.	The	marriage	would	inevitably	end
in	divorce.	Britain	joined	for	the	wrong	reasons	(a	marriage	made	in	Hell	not	in	Heaven),	the	EU	as	a	partner
developed	more	and	more	marriage	habits	that	Britain	disliked,	and,	eventually,	Britain	felt	it	could	find	better
partners	outside	the	marriage.	No	more	explanation	needed.	This	narrative	is	just	too	simple.	First,	we	have	no
measure	or	definition	of	‘awkwardness’.	How	do	we	know	that	Britain	has	been	more	‘awkward’	than,	say	France,
still	remembered	for	the	‘empty	chair’	episode	in	1965?	Was	Mrs	Thatcher	any	more	‘awkward’	in	her	1988	“Bruges
Speech”	than	General	De	Gaulle	in	1965?	However	awkward	Britain	may	have	been,	it	was	never	threatened	with
the	Article	7	procedure	for	breaching	the	EU’s	founding	values	(the	so-called	nuclear	option)	as	is	the	case	with
Hungary	and	Poland	today.
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Boris	Johnson	at	11pm	on	31	January	2020,	the	moment	the	UK	left	the	European	Union,	Credit:	Andrew	Parsons	/	No10	Downing
Street	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
Moreover,	does	‘awkwardness’	distinguish	between	being	awkward	at	the	policy	making	stage	in	the	EU	and	being
awkward	at	the	stage	of	implementing	EU	policy?	If	we	focus	on	EU	policy-making,	perhaps	Britain	has	often
articulated	concerns	that	other	member	states	shared	but	were	reluctant	to	raise	so	clearly	and	publicly?	As
Daddow	and	Oliver	argue,	Britain	has	often	been	a	constructive	and	influential	partner	notably	regarding	the	Single
European	Act,	economic	reform,	but	also	in	policy	areas	such	as	deregulation,	privatisation,	climate	change,	and
even	animal	welfare	legislation.
Having	joined	late,	Britain	adjusted	quickly	to	the	EC/EU	policy	style.	For	example,	Britain	became	a	model	of	how
to	co-ordinate	domestic	EU	policy-making,	and	British	interest	groups	adapted	to	European	level	lobbying	like
ducks	to	water.	In	particular,	if	we	look	at	the	implementation	of	EU	policy,	it	is	simply	impossible	to	characterise
Britain	as	an	awkward	partner	as	it	has	an	excellent	record	in	implementing	EU	laws.
Thus,	it	is	possible	to	turn	the	‘awkward	partner’	narrative	on	its	head.	Perhaps	Britain	was	actually	a	good	member
of	the	EU,	contributing	constructively	in	EU	policy-making,	fighting	hard	when	it	felt	the	need	to	(just	like	other
member	states),	and	not	regarding	laws	properly	passed	by	the	EU	as	simply	‘cheap	talk’	to	be	ignored	in	practice.
From	this	perspective,	it	was	not	inevitable	that	Britain	would	leave	the	EU	at	some	point,	as	the	EU	and	the	UK
had	learned	to	live	together	rather	well.	Like	most	marriages,	there	are	a	few	rows	along	the	way!
As	the	saying	goes	it	takes	two	to	tango.	It	is	easy	to	blame	British	governments	and	the	British	electorate	for
Brexit.	However,	the	long-term	role	of	European	elites,	and	the	EU	institutions	which	they	created	and	expanded,
played	a	significant	part	in	the	emergence	of	the	Brexit	fiasco	and,	indeed,	in	the	more	general	(very	long-running
and	‘to	be	continued’)	crisis	within	the	EU.	The	seemingly	inexorable	expansion	of	EU	public	policy	helped	to	lay
the	bedrock	of	Brexit.
So	great	has	been	the	EU’s	expansion	into	‘core	state	powers’,	and	so	vast	has	been	the	reach	of	EU	law,	that	the
EU	has	developed	into	a	veritable	‘policy-making	state’.	But	whatever	characterisation	of	the	EU	we	choose,	it	is
unarguable	that	the	range	of	policy	areas	in	which	the	EU	has	at	least	some	remit	is	now	vast.	It	has	also	gradually
shifted	towards	a	more	coercive	top-down	policy	style.	Take	the	specific	policy	area	of	immigration,	which	has	led	to
the	dismantling	of	the	boundaries	of	domestic	labour	markets	as	well	as	national	welfare	systems.	The
communitarisation	of	immigration	policy	has	undoubtedly	had	a	disproportionate	effect	on	the	attitudes	of	national
electorates	towards	EU	membership.
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Against	this	backdrop,	the	EU	itself	might	have	been	involved	in	two	kinds	of	blunder.	First,	has	it	been	in	some	kind
of	‘slow	burn’	blunder	via	task	expansion,	pushing	integration	generally	too	far	and	too	fast	for	its	peoples	to
swallow?	Secondly,	has	the	specific	policy	of	free	movement	of	workers	turned	out	to	be	a	policy	disaster	of
considerable	proportions	because	of	its	serious	unintended	consequences	for	the	support	of	the	integration	project
as	whole?
Finally,	turning	to	purely	domestic	policy-making	factors,	we	need	to	be	careful	in	seeing	the	Brexit	omnishambles
as	something	especially	unusual	in	British	politics.	Brexit	was	certainly	a	spectacular	omnishambles,	but	it	was
certainly	not	a	unique	example	of	the	British	policy-making	process	not	running	smoothly.	Policy	fiascos	and
blunders	are	as	British	as	fish	and	chips!	To	be	sure,	for	much	of	the	post-war	period,	British	policy-making
emphasised	fact	based,	deliberative,	consensual	policy-making.	However,	the	post-1979	period	has	seen	major
changes	in	the	British	policy	style,	notably	a	considerable	weakening	of	the	civil	service,	the	increasing	role	of
political	advisers	in	government,	the	arrival	of	ministers	who	are	deeply	committed	to	a	particular	set	of	ideas,	and	a
considerable	weakening	of	interest	group	influence	.
One	of	the	strangest	aspects	of	the	Brexit	saga	is	the	lack	of	interest	group	influence,	especially	that	of	business.	It
is	not	that	the	interest	groups	did	not	bark.	Having	played	a	significant	role	in	getting	the	UK	into	Europe,	and
having	played	a	major	role	in	the	UK’s	period	within	Europe,	interest	groups	played	little	or	no	role	in	the	UK’s	exit
from	Europe.
The	marginalisation	of	interest	groups	was	part	of	a	broader	phenomenon,	namely	the	marginalisation	of	experts.
Pro-Brexit	politicians	had	their	own	equivalent	of	President	Trump’s	‘gut	feelings’.	The	ultimate	irony	of	the	2019
election	is	that	the	Conservatives	were	successful	in	convincing	voters	that	they	could	clean	up	a	mess	which	the
Conservatives	themselves	had	created	and	in	managing	to	avoid	any	serious	discussion	of	the	huge	policy
problems	to	be	solved	in	the	period	after	Brexit.	The	irony	of	the	finale	to	three	years	of	Conservative
omnishambles	is	emblematic	for	this	day	and	age.	It	ended	with	a	polished	last	act	by	someone,	Boris	Johnson,
thought	to	be	a	buffoon.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	article	in	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy
(open	access)
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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